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DIRECT LIABILITY AND VEIL-PIERCING: WHEN
ONE DOOR CLOSES, ANOTHER OPENS
King Fung Tsang* & Katie Ng**
ABSTRACT
Piercing the corporate veil has been substantially limited in English
law since Prest v. Petrodel. This contraction coincides with the
development of the direct liability doctrine which attaches liability
directly on the parent company. The authors argue that the shift from
using piercing the corporate veil to direct liability is a positive
development as it gives English courts a better tool to combat the
abuse of separate legal personality. However, compared the English
doctrines with their counterparts under the U.S. laws, it is argued that
the much broader U.S. piercing doctrine makes the expansion of direct
liability doctrine unnecessary in the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In both English and American law, piercing the corporate veil is a
judicial remedy created for the purpose of combating abuse of the separate
legal personality.1 Yet, over the past three decades, this doctrine has been

1. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991) (“‘Piercing the corporate veil’ refers to the judicially
imposed exception to this principle by which courts disregard the separateness of the
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developing in two different directions. Under English law, piercing the
corporate veil has slowly and steadily been relegated to a very narrow
application. The final nail in the coffin was the U.K. Supreme Court’s
decision in Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd.,2 which essentially limited
the doctrine to the evasion of existing liabilities. Further, it will only be
applied as a last resort.3 From this perspective, the balance between
certainty and equity in company law seems to tip towards the former.
Conversely, in the United States, piercing the corporate veil has been said
to be the most litigated matter in U.S. law,4 despite also often being
described as a last resort5 that should be applied sparingly.6 There is no
sign that this is going to change.7 Thus, there is a legitimate question as
to whether the narrowing in veil-piercing is the right direction for English
company law.
However, the narrowing in veil-piercing under English law does not
mean that the English courts have given up on holding shareholders liable

corporation and hold a shareholder responsible for the corporation’s action as if it were
the shareholder’s own.”).
2. Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd. [2013] UKSC 34, [35].
3. Id. at [62]. Lord Neuberger cited Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2008] EWHC 2380
(Fam) with approval where Justice Munby opined that the court could only pierce the
corporate veil “in favour of a party when all other, more conventional, remedies have
proved to be of no assistance.” Ben Hashem at [100]. Lord Mance opined that the
situations in which piercing the corporate veil may be available as a final fall-back are
“likely to be novel and very rare.” Ben Hashem at [103]. Lord Clarke expressed
agreement with Lord Mance and others in this regard.
4. See Thompson, supra note 1.
5. Gregory Allan, To Pierce or Not to Pierce? A Doctrinal Reappraisal of Judicial
Response to Improper Exploitation of the Corporate Form, J. BUS. L. 559, 561 (2018).
A final point to note is that, since Prest, it has been accepted that veilpiercing is a course of last resort, and is only possible through
operation of the ‘evasion principle’, which is triggered when a
company is exploited to enable its controlling shareholder to avoid an
existing legal obligation.
Id.

6. See, e.g., Prest [2013] UKSC 34 at [67]; Amlin (SA) (Pty) Ltd. v. Van Kooij 2007
(60) ZAWCHC 1 (SA) at 15 para. 23 (S. Afr.) (holding that piercing the veil “must be
resorted to rather sparingly and indeed as the very last resort in circumstances where
justice will not otherwise be done between two litigants.”).
7. See King Fung Tsang, Applicable Law in Piercing the Corporate Veil in the
United States: A Choice with No Choice, 10 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 227, 235 (2014) (finding
more than 300 piercing cases in 2012 alone).
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for the abuse of the corporate form. The explicit contraction of the
piercing doctrine coincides with an implicit expansion of the doctrine of
direct liability.8 The doctrine of direct liability allows a court to hold a
parent company responsible for the liabilities of its subsidiary through
attaching liability on the former directly.9 This doctrine is based on tort
law.10 By interfering with the affairs of the subsidiary, the parent company
risks being held responsible to third parties who suffered harm from the
subsidiary’s conduct.11 This principle was developed by Lord Bingham in
Lubbe v. Cape Industry PLC12 as obiter dictum, applied by Arden L.J. in
Chandler v. Cape PLC,13 and expanded by the U.K. Supreme Court in
Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe.14 Most recently, the doctrine was
further refined and confirmed by the U.K. Supreme Court in Okpabi v.
Royal Dutch Shell Plc,15 which evidenced the intention of the English
courts to retain the broadness of direct liability.
Arden L.J. made it crystal clear that the direct liability doctrine is not
piercing the corporate veil16 and rightly so, since the former keeps the
separate legal existence of the subsidiary intact.17 However, the economic
8. Rian Matthews, Clarification of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 28
J. INT’L BANKING L. & REGUL. 516, 520 (2013). “Recent decisions suggest that the courts,
whilst unwilling to pierce the corporate veil as such, are increasingly willing to
circumvent it through more conventional causes of action where justice demands this and
it is consistent with existing principle. For example, in Chandler v Cape Plc.” Id. See
also PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER: PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
COMPANY LAW 201 (10th ed. 2016); Martin Petrin, Assumption of Responsibility in
Corporate Groups: Chandler v Cape plc, 70 Mod. L. Rev. 603, 604 (2013) (“[I]n order
to bypass the difficulties associated with veil piercing, claimants after Adams began to
initiate claims against parent companies on the basis that the parent owed them a direct
duty of care.”).
9. Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [70], [80].
10. Id. at [70].
11. Id. at [64].
12. Lubbe v. Cape Industries plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545 (HL) 1555 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
13. Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 at [33], [81].
14. Vedanta Res. plc v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [49], [53].
15. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell plc [2021] UKSC 3 [147].
16. Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [69] (“I would empathetically reject any
suggestion that this court is in any way concerned with what is usually referred to as
piercing the corporate veil.”).
17. Id. (“A subsidiary and its company are separate entities. There is no imposition
or assumption of responsibility by reason only that a company is the parent company of
another company.”).
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effect is the same as piercing the corporate veil; namely, the parent is
responsible for the liability of its subsidiary. Accordingly, when standing
in the claimant’s shoes, it is of little significance whether the corporate
veil is pierced or not. In this sense, direct liability is itself just a disguised
piercing the corporate veil.
Although the English courts claim that the direct liability doctrine is
nothing but an application of the age-old tort principle,18 it is surely a new
avenue through which a court can hold a parent company responsible for
a subsidiary’s liability. Similar application of tort principle to parentsubsidiary liability, however, can be traced back almost a century in the
United States.19 Despite some expansions of the doctrine in individual
states, direct liability in the United States generally remains as an
exception to piercing the corporate veil.20 Thus, piercing the corporate
veil remains the dominant way to hold parent company responsible for
the liability of the subsidiary. In examining the developments of piercing
the corporate veil and direct liability in the two countries, it is clear that,
despite sharing the same common law tradition, they are going in different
directions.
This article is an endeavor to explain the development of direct
liability on both sides of the Atlantic. Pushing aside the technical
distinction between the doctrines, the critical question is whether these
developments are good for English and U.S. law, respectively. This query
will be assessed from two separate but related perspectives. First, does
direct liability promote equity or correct injustice in a way that cannot be
properly addressed by the current veil piercing doctrine? Second, does the
direct liability doctrine improve the problem of uncertainty that plagued
the piercing doctrine previously?

18.
19.

See Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20 at [54].
See William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 197-98 (1929).
20. See Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 755 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[F]inding that
[defendant] was liable as a ‘direct participant’ may be justifiable under a well-established
exception to the general rule that the corporate veil will not be pierced in the absence of
large-scale disregard of the separate existence of a subsidiary corporation.”). See also
Lozada-Leoni v. MoneyGram Int’l, No. 20CV68-RWS-CMC, 2020 WL 7000874, at *22
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2020); Good v. Am. Water Works Co., No. CV 14-01374, 2016 WL
5402230, at *8 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 25, 2016) (calling direct liability “less widely applied
than the doctrine of corporate veil-piercing”); United States v. All Meat & Poultry Prod.
Stored at Lagrou Cold Storage, 470 F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Pearson v.
Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 486-87 (3d Cir. 2001); Forsythe v. Clark USA,
836 N.E.2d 850, 854 (Ill. 2005).
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Our answers to both questions are affirmative for English law. On
the first question, with the narrowing of the piercing the corporate
doctrine in England, the expansion of direct liability is both necessary and
desirable to equip the English courts with a tool to combat the abuse of
corporate form, especially in the context of transnational corporations. On
the second question, the direct liability test does not include the vague
concept of impropriety and therefore provides more predictable results as
courts develop further guidelines on the level of control required to find
direct liability. We should therefore call this a positive development in
English law. However, the same cannot be said for U.S. law. First, since
the U.S. piercing doctrine has a wider breadth and can potentially be
applied to many forms of corporate abuse, there is no urgency to expand
the direct liability doctrine in the United States. Second, the U.S. direct
liability doctrine also contains plenty of uncertainties, particularly with
regard to its acceptance in some states. This Article therefore argues that
direct liability shall continue play a supplementary role to the piercing
doctrine in the United States, especially in states that adopt stricter
standard in the piercing doctrine.
Part II of this article traces the downfall of piercing the corporate veil
and the simultaneous rise of the direct liability doctrine under English
law. Part III outlines how the two doctrines are used by the U.S. courts.
Part IV then compares both English doctrines against their counterparts
in the United States. Part V assesses the direct liability doctrine from the
perspectives of equity and certainty, and whether, together with the
existing piercing the corporate veil doctrine, the company law is
improved. Finally, Part VI concludes this article.
II. ENGLISH LAW
A. RISE AND FALL OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Under English law, piercing the corporate veil has been an elusive
doctrine from its inception.21 Neither of the two earliest U.K. cases on this
21. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (2005) (“‘Piercing’ seems to happen freakishly.
Like lightening, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled.”); Austin R. Spotorno, Piercing the
Corporate Veil in the UK: The Never-Ending Mess, 39 BUS L. REV. 102, 102 (2018)
(“Predictability and certainty are the distinctive features of English law as one of the
leading choices to govern commercial contracts worldwide. Unfortunately, an area which
cannot be praised for that is the ‘Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil.’”).
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topic adopted the title of “piercing.”22 In fact, the term “piercing the
corporate veil” was coined by the courts of the United States.23 As we will
see, on top of its fluidity, the test has remained unclear.
1. A Control Test at the Outset
Despite its ambiguous nature, there is no doubt that the piercing
doctrine is a valuable safety valve to the strict limited liability doctrine
set in stone by Salomon v. Salomon.24 D.H.N. Food Distributors Ltd. v.
Tower Hamlets London Borough Council25 is one illustration of how the
rigidity of the limited liability doctrine had been addressed by the piercing
doctrine. D.H.N. was the parent company of two subsidiaries, one of
which owned land that was used by D.H.N. to operate its business. When
the land was subject to a compulsory purchase order, an issue arose as to
whether D.H.N. was entitled to compensation for disturbance of its
business.26 In reaching his decision, Lord Denning favored the equity
element at the expense of certainty and adopted the “single economic
unit” doctrine. He recognized the extensive control exerted by the parent
company over the wholly-owned subsidiaries:
[W]hen a parent company owns all the shares of the subsidiaries —
so much so that it can control every movement of the subsidiaries.
These subsidiaries are bound hand and foot to the parent company and
must do just what the parent company says . . . . So here. This group
is virtually the same as a partnership in which all the three companies
are partners. [Accordingly, t]hey should not be treated separately so
as to be defeated on a technical point.27

The “technical point” that Lord Denning refers to is the separate legal
existence. The key to break down this technicality is the presence of
dominating control exerted by parent company over the subsidiary.

22. See Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne [1933] 1 Ch 935; Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1
WLR 832.
23. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1925).
24. Salomon v. Salomon & Co. 75 LT 426 SC (HL) (UK).
25. D.H.N. Food Distrib. Ltd. v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1
WLR 852 at 853 (Eng.).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 860.
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2. Shifting Towards an Impropriety Test
However, D.H.N. proved to be a high-water mark of the piercing
doctrine in England.28 The single economic unit doctrine was doubted by
the House of Lords soon after in Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional
Council.29 Lord Keith pointed out that the ability of a parent company to
control a subsidiary should not by itself be sufficient to pierce the
corporate veil.30 Instead, “it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only
where special circumstances exist indicating that is a mere façade
concealing the true facts.”31 Nevertheless, there was still a big question
mark over the precise meaning of “mere façade concealing the true
facts.”32 One thing that became clear is the insufficiency of mere control
28. Los Watkins & Hamiisi Junior Nsubuga, The Road to Prest v Petrodel: An
Analysis of the UK Judicial Approach to the Corporate Veil – Part 1, 31 INT’L CO. &
COM. L. REV. 547, 550 (2020) (“This was, perhaps, the high point of the liberal
interpretation of circumstances in which the veil of incorporation may be lifted.”).
29. Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] HL 95. See Thomas K. Cheng,
The Corporate Veil Doctrine Revisited: A Comparative Study of the English and the U.S.
Corporate Veil Doctrines, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 329, 339-40 (2011).
30. Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] HL 95 at 96 (Scot.).

The grounds for the decision were (1) that since D.H.N. was in a
position to control its subsidiaries in every respect, it was proper to
pierce the corporate veil and treat the group as a single economic
entity for the purpose of awarding compensation for disturbance . . . .
I have some doubts whether in this respect the Court of Appeal
properly applied the principle that it is appropriate to pierce the
corporate veil.
Id.

31.
32.

Id.
See Gregory Mitchell, “Veil Piercing”: An Unnecessary Doctrine?, 5 J. INT’L.
BANKING & FIN. L. 317, 319 (2019).
Lord Sumption noted that previously the basis of the doctrine was that
the ‘veil’ could only be pierced where there were circumstances which
indicated that the company was a mere ‘sham’ or ‘façade’, used by the
wrongdoer to perpetrate/conceal some form of relevant impropriety.
As Lord Sumption points out, the problem with this formulation is that
it is very difficult to identify what a ‘relevant impropriety’ is because
reference to a ‘façade’ or a ‘sham’ begs too many questions.
Id. at 317.
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to justify piercing the corporate veil, marking the shift of focus from
control to impropriety.33
Fourteen years after D.H.N., the piercing doctrine received an
elaborate examination by Justice Slate in Adams v. Cape Industries
PLC,34 which for many years was regarded as the leading authority on the
principle.35 Cape Industries was an English company that owned some
overseas subsidiaries.36 A group of U.S. workers who were employed by
the Cape’s agent in the United States suffered illness from working in an
asbestos factory. They obtained a favorable judgment in United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas and sought to enforce it
against Cape in the English court.37 To iron out the conflict of law issues,
the English court had to decide whether Cape had a U.S. presence through
its Texas subsidiary.38 During his analysis, Justice Slate clarified that the
Court is not free to “disregard the principle of [separate legal personality
doctrine set out in Salomon v. Salomon] . . . merely because it considers”
that justice so requires.39 Instead, the court thought the proper test should
be based on distinguishing the evasion of existing liabilities and the
avoidance of future liabilities:
We do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift the
corporate veil as against a defendant company which is the member
of a corporate group merely because the corporate structure has been
used so as to ensure that the legal liability (if any) in respect of
particular future activities of the group (and correspondingly the risk
of enforcement of that liability) will fall on another member of the
group rather than the defendant company. Whether or not this is
desirable, the right to use a corporate structure in this manner is
inherent in our corporate law.40

On the facts of this case, the court endorsed the legitimacy of Cape’s
organizational structure and its expectation that the court would uphold
the Salomon principle. In making this determination, the court did
consider whether the entity was purposely arranged this way to remove
the risks of tortious liability while obtaining benefits from the group’s
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id.
See Adams v. Cape Indus. plc [1990] Ch 433.
DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 8.
Adams [1990] Ch 433 at 435.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 544.
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asbestos trade in the United States.41 Thus, scholars have argued that after
Adams, tort claimants in England have little chance to succeed in piercing
the corporate veil.42
3. Transforming from a Standard-Based to a Rule-Based Test
Up through Adams, the piercing doctrine had gone under a series of
narrowing processes, limiting it significantly from what Lord Denning
had initially outlined.43 The ball kept rolling in Prest, which transformed
the doctrine from a standard-based test that broadly addressed
impropriety, as seen in Woolfson, to a narrow rule-based test involving
only the evasion of existing liabilities.
In delivering the most elaborate analysis of the doctrine in Prest,
Lord Sumption found that most of the “piercing” cases were not true
piercing cases.44 Instead, a lot of these matters simply involved peeking
behind the corporate veil instead of piercing it, which would have
required disregarding the corporate existence.45 In Lord Sumption’s
opinion, only Jones v. Lipman46 and Gilford Motor Co. Ltd. v. Horne 47
were true piercing cases.48 In light of this, he further confined the
41.
42.
43.

Id.
See Cheng, supra note 29, at 362.
Allan, supra note 5, at 572.
The courts also notoriously sought to expand the ambit of the piercing
jurisdiction to scenarios outside of the façade/sham exception.
Examples include veil-piercing within corporate groups on the ground
that such companies operate as a single economic unit, and veilpiercing to satisfy the demands of justice. Although these grounds for
veil-piercing quickly foundered under the weight of judicial
conservatism, the Court of Appeal has in this millennium pierced the
veil for justice’s sake in order to establish that a solicitor owed
fiduciary duties not just to the subsidiary that had instructed him, but
also to the parent company of the subsidiary’s parent company.

Id.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd. [2013] UKSC 34, [28].
Id.
Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832.
Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne [1933] 1 Ch 935.
See Prest [2013] UKSC 34 at [28]-[30]. But see id. at [73]-[74] (explaining, in
the concurring judgment delivered by Lord Neuberger, that he regarded Gilford Motor as
the only true piercing case).
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operation of the doctrine to only those matters involving evasion of
existing liabilities, such as those discussed in Adams.49
Prest stands for the principle that veil piercing can only be utilized
by a court to deal with abuse of right when an impropriety exists.50 “The
authorities show that there are limited circumstances in which the law
treats the use of a company as a means of evading the law as dishonest
for this purpose.”51 It also appears that Lord Sumption was keen to restrict
the use of this doctrine so that it would only be used as a “last resort.”52
However, his view on evasion of liabilities was not shared by the majority
of the Supreme Court.53 Despite their differences of opinion, the one thing
that can be said with confidence is that their lordships all recognized the
difficulty in developing any other exception to the Salomon doctrine aside
from the evasion principle.54
Absent an agreed approach among the members of the Prest Court,55
the current English law position nevertheless seems to be Lord
Sumption’s evasion principle, which itself is not completely free of
ambiguity. Shortly after Prest, the English Court of Appeal in Antonio

49.
50.
51.
52.

Prest [2013] UKSC 34 at [28].
Id. at [18].
Id.
Id. at [35] (“I consider that if it is not necessary to pierce the corporate veil, it is
not appropriate to do so, because on that footing there is no public policy imperative
which justifies that course.”). See also Allan, supra note 5.
A final point to note is that, since Prest, it has been accepted that veilpiercing is a course of last resort, and is only possible through
operation of the ‘evasion principle’, which is triggered when a
company is exploited to enable its controlling shareholder to avoid an
existing legal obligation.
Allan, supra note 5.
53. Ernest Lim, Salomon Reigns, 129 L.Q. REV. 480, 484 (2013) (“Thus,
unsurprisingly, none of the judges endorsed Lord Sumption’s formulation of the principle
for piercing the corporate veil, except Lord Neuberger.”). See Prest [2013] UKSC 34 at
[84]-[106].
54. Prest [2013] UKSC 34 at [102]-[103].
55. See Watkins & Nsubuga, supra note 28, at 600 (attributing the absence of an
agreed approach to “the narrowness of the redefinition of the concealment and evasion
principles, and rationalising evasion as the true ground for veil-piercing but narrowing
its parameters to the company or its company or its controller’s attempt to evade preexisting legal obligations or liabilities.”).
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Gramsci Shipping Corp. v. Lembergs56 affirmed that “the Court can only
pierce the corporate veil when ‘a person is under an existing legal
obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he
deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by
interposing a company under his control.’”57 This was the conclusion
reached by Beatson L.J. despite knowing that the other members of the
Prest Court held different opinions.58
The U.K Supreme Court recently handed down a fresh judgment that
further solidified piercing the corporate veil as an obsolete principle in
practice. In Hurstwood Properties (A) Ltd. v. Rossendale, the respondent
developers owned properties that were subject to non-domestic rates.59
The matter arose because the developers had leased those properties to
some special vehicle companies (“SPVs”) to avoid the non-domestic
rates.60 These SPVs were liquidated after they defaulted on the rates
payments.61 The local authorities contended that the arrangement was an
abuse of the separate legal personality and therefore called for piercing
the corporate veil.62 In their discussion of the principle, Lord Briggs and
Lord Leggatt opined that “whether the evasion principle is needed or
provides the best justification of cases such as Gilford Motor and Jones is
itself open to debate.”63 In particular, they subscribed to Lord Walker’s
doubts in Prest, which questioned whether “piercing the corporate veil is
a coherent principle or rule of law at all, as opposed to simply a label used
to describe the disparate occasions on which some rule of law produces
apparent exceptions to the principle of separate juristic personality of a
corporate body.”64 In spite of these doubts, their lordships did not find the
present case as an occasion to reach any final view, and applied Lord
Sumption’s evasion principle against the facts.65 They ultimately

56.
(Eng.).
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp. v. Lembergs [2013] EWCA (Civ) 730 AC
Id. at [65].
Id. at [65]-[66].
Hurstwood Properties v. Rossendale Borough Council [2021] UKSC 16 (Eng.).
Id. at [2].
Id.
Id. at [63].
Id. See also Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd. [2013] UKSC 34, [106].
Hurstwood [2021] UKSC 16 at [71].
Id. at [71]-[76].
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concluded that there was no room for a piercing argument to stand in this
particular case.66
All in all, since D.H.N. in 1976, the piercing doctrine has been slowly
and steadily chipped away by the English courts. At first, control was the
key criterion, per Lord Denning’s formulation, under which the court
would simply examine the relationship between the parent and
subsidiary.67 The House of Lords then shifted into an impropriety test,
with subsequent courts gradually turning a broad standard of impropriety
into a narrow rule on just evasion of existing liability.68 It may be argued
that the current law clearly values certainty over equity. In fact, the test
has become so “certain” that one could legitimately wonder whether its
function is any more than decorative. The classic scenario of veilpiercing, superimposing a company to evade existing liability, can easily
be handled by alternative doctrines such as specific performance or
agency.69 It will no longer need to rely on the last resort of piercing the
corporate veil. As far as English law is concerned, the piercing doctrine
is now on life support.
B. DIRECT LIABILITY
The downfall of the piercing doctrine coincides with the rise of direct
liability. Although the court never applies the two doctrines together in a
single case, they can both achieve the same effect, namely, making parent
liable to the claimant who suffered damage from the subsidiaries’
conducts.
1. Lubbe v. Cape PLC – a Promising Idea
The direct liability doctrine was initially developed through three
cases involving Cape Industries. The first was the aforementioned case,
Adams, which, by affirming the strictness of limited liability and narrowly
interpreting the piercing doctrine, left the U.S. tort victims with no
compensation.70 Although this case did not discuss direct liability as a

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at [75]-[76].
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.A.2-3.
See Prest [2013] UKSC 34 at [73], [92].
Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1990] Ch 433.
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way to hold parent companies liable, its culling of the piercing rule set the
table for a new doctrine to be developed in future cases. 71
Thereafter, the House of Lords decided another highly significant
case, Lubbe v. Cape PLC.72 Cape PLC is an English public company that
had invested in asbestos production in South Africa through a chain of
local subsidiaries.73 Similar to Adams, claimants were employees working
for an overseas subsidiary of Cape PLC and suffered personal injury or
death as a result asbestos exposure.74 However, Lubbe’s claimants were
in a worse situation because they were locals in South Africa, which had
a dearth of legal aid and contingency arrangements, both of which
incentivize lawyers to take up such matters. The essence of the case is the
allegation that Cape PLC, instead of claimants’ employer or factory
occupier, owed a direct duty of care towards claimants in its capacity as
the parent company.75 To resolve this issue, the court observed that its
inquiry would involve examining the part played by the parent company
in “controlling the operations of the group,” the knowledge of its directors
and employees, and “what action was taken or not taken.”76 At last, the
House of Lords sided with the claimants, grounding its decision on the
factor of control.77 In particular, Lord Bingham expressed that direct
liability could be attached to the U.K. parent company through tort law:
“The plaintiffs’ claims raise a serious legal issue concerning the duty of
the defendant as a parent company . . . . If a duty were held to exist, there
would be a serious factual issue whether the defendant was in breach of
it.”78 The duty arose from the parent company’s failure to take appropriate
steps to ensure adoption of proper working practices and safety
precautions while knowing the health risks.79 It is notable that Lord
Bingham did not refer to this analysis as piercing the corporate veil.80
Further, given the fact that it was a forum non conveniens case, his view
was merely an obiter dictum. At that point of time, therefore, direct
liability of a parent company was just an idea; however, it was a
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 546-50 (discussing agency as another pathway).
Lubbe v. Cape PLC [2000] 1 WLR 1545 (HL).
Id. at 1551.
Id. at 1550.
Id.
Id. at 1555.
Id. at 1562.
Id. at 1557.
See id. at 1551.
See id. at 1557.
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promising one. Lord Bingham opened the door for future cases to achieve
the effect of piercing the corporate veil through another route.81 The
significance of this case lies in the endorsement by the House of Lords of
the possibility to hold a parent company directly liable, despite former
analogous English cases that held otherwise.82
2. Chandler v. Cape – a Cautious First Step
The matter was once again brought to the table for discussion in
Chandler.83 This ground-breaking case is the first to attach direct liability
on a parent company. Taking the promising idea from Lubbe, the court
cautiously designed the requisite circumstances where the law may
impose on a parent company the responsibility for the health and safety
of its subsidiary’s employees.84 As will be seen below, while the actual
test adopted by the court is built around the level of control exercised by
the parent over the subsidiary, the court imposed additional conditions
that must be met before direct liability may be attached.
Claimant was an employee of a company called Cape Products,
which manufactured bricks and asbestos products.85 The asbestos
products were produced in an unenclosed part of the site, and toxic dust
migrated to another area where the claimant worked.86 Claimant
contracted asbestosis consequent to exposure to asbestos during his
employment.87 As a result, he brought an action against Cape, Cape
Products’ parent company, since the subsidiary no longer existed.88 The
issue was whether the parent company owed a direct duty to the
subsidiary’s employees.89

81.
82.

See Chandler v. Cape plc [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [40], [62].
See Connelly v. RTZ Corp. plc [1997] UKHL 30. See also Ngcobo v. Thor
Chem. Holdings [1995] AC 1 at 2-3.
83. Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) at [64].
84. Id. at [80].
85. Id. at [3].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at [1].
89. Id.
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a. Assumption of Responsibility
In general, a party does not owe a duty of care to prevent third parties
from harming another.90 However, one of the exceptions to this rule is the
assumption of liability.91 The court relied on this basis to hold that Cape
had assumed responsibility of Cape Products. This deviation was not
created out of the blue.92 Instead, Arden L.J. took advantage of the door
left opened by Lord Bingham’s obiter dictum in Lubbe:
[A]t page 1555 Lord Bingham expressly contemplated that it might
involve as in this case a detailed examination of the relationship
between the parties based on the surviving documentary material . . .
. The basis on which the judge found there was a duty of care on the
part of Cape is on the basis of an assumption of responsibility.93

In fact, the principle stemmed from an earlier House of Lords
decision in Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office,94 where Home Office was
found to owe a duty of care to the owners of moored yachts damaged by
borstal boys who escaped from its supervision.95 The control exercised by
Home Office over the boys gave rise to a special proximate relationship
in law between the claimants and Home Office.96 Thus, Control exercised
by parent company is the most important element of the assumption of

90.
91.

See Smith v. Littlewoods Org. [1987] AC 241 at 271.
Id. at 272 (“[A] duty may arise from a special relationship between the defender
and the third party, by virtue of which the defender is responsible for controlling the third
party.”).
92. See Vedanta Res. plc v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [60] (“This was not a case
of the assertion, for the first time, of a novel and controversial new category of case.”).
93. Chandler v. Cape plc [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [40], [62].
94. [1970] HL 1004 (Engl.).
95. Id. at 1005.
96. Id. at 1036.
The conclusion that I have reached is that the officers owed a duty to
the company to take such care as in all the circumstances was
reasonable with a view of preventing the boys in their charge and
under their control from causing damage to the nearby property of the
company if that was a happening of which there was a manifest and
obvious risk.
Id.
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responsibility test.97 In addition, through utilizing assumption of
responsibility, the court also implicitly incorporated the element of
reliance, which is recognized as a necessary component in establishing
assumption of responsibility.98
b. Creating A New Category of Duty Under Caparo
In Chandler, the English Court of Appeal carved out a new duty of
care by applying the three-stage test derived from Caparo Industries PLC
v. Dickman.99 The three prongs are foreseeability, proximity, and whether
it is “fair, just[,] and reasonable” to impose liability.100 It should be
foreseeable that the defendant’s carelessness could cause damage to the
claimant; there should exist between the defendant and the claimant a
relationship characterized by law as one of “proximity” or
“neighborhood”; and the situation should be one where the court
considers it “fair, just[,] and reasonable to impose liability.”101 The
Caparo test needs only be satisfied for the creation of a new category of
duty.102
Arden L.J. looked at the matter from the perspective of proximity
while blending the question on fairness into her consideration.103 In
applying this test to the facts of Chandler, the Court found that the
required proximity was established through control.104 Here, Cape
dictated health and safety policies that bound its subsidiary, and Cape had
full awareness of the “systemic failure” which allowed migration of
asbestos into the area where the claimant worked.105 Moreover, Cape
employed a “group chief chemist” and a “group medical advisor”
responsible for product development and researching of asbestos related
diseases.

97. See Petrin, supra note 8, at 612 (“Under the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, control
represents an assumption of responsibility”).
98. Id. at 616.
99. Caparo Indus. v. Dickman [1990] HL 1 (Engl.).
100. Id. at 5.
101. Id.
102. See Robinson v. Chief Constable W. Yorkshire [2018] UKSC 4, [21]-[29].
103. Chandler v. Cape plc [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [62].
104. Id. at [72]-[80].
105. Id. at [77].
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c. Knowledge as a Key Consideration
However, control is not the only factor the court looked at. Another
related factor the court focused on was knowledge. The evidence that
established control also suggested that Cape must have had knowledge
that only slight exposure to asbestos dust was needed to cause disease.
Thus, the knowledge factor contributed to the conclusion that Cape
assumed overall responsibility to either advise Cape Products on steps to
be taken to provide a safe work environment or “ensure that those steps
were taken.”106 This is so even though Cape itself was not responsible for
the actual implementation of the policies.107
Towards the end of the judgment, Arden L.J. summarized four
indicia for this sort of liability to attach:
In summary, this case demonstrates that in appropriate circumstances
the law may impose on a parent company responsibility for the health
and safety of its subsidiary’s employees. Those circumstances include
a situation where, as in the present case, (1) the businesses of the
parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same; (2) the parent
has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of
health and safety in the particular industry; (3) the subsidiary’s system
of work is unsafe as the parent company knew, or ought to have
known; and (4) the parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the
subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using that superior
knowledge for the employees’ protection. For the purposes of (4) it is
not necessary to show that the parent is in the practice of intervening
in the health and safety policies of the subsidiary. The court will look
at the relationship between the companies more widely. The court may
find that element (4) is established where the evidence shows that the
parent has a practice of intervening in the trading operations of the
subsidiary, for example production and funding issues.108

Amongst all four indicia, the last factor, the discussion of
interferences by the parent over the operation of the subsidiary, is
particularly important. In effect, “interference” is another way of
expressing “control” actually exercised by the parent over the subsidiary.
Notably, the control does not have to be over the health and safety policies
of the subsidiary.109 However, Knowledge is also featured prominently in
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at [78].
Id. at [74].
Id. at [80].
Id.
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the indicia. It is given an important role as both (2) and (3) relates to
knowledge of the parent. Thus, in addition to control, the English court
has added knowledge as a key consideration.
d. A New Control Test
In summary, although the emphasis on control appears to bring the
law all the way back to the position in D.H.N., this new control test should
be distinguished from that discussed in D.H.N. There are two important
distinctions. First, the new control test is much more stringent. Chandler
borrowed the framework from tort, particularly the assumption of
responsibility factor which incorporated the additional requirement of
reliance into the control test.110 Further, in analyzing direct liability as a
new category of duty, the courts mandated the application of the Caparo
test and made the satisfaction of foreseeability and proximity
requirements for the establishment of the duty.111 Knowledge of the parent
is also featured prominently in the application of the test.112 Second, in
D.H.N., Lord Denning spoke of the possible exercise of such control on
paper, which may or may not be exercised, but here it refers to control
actually exercised.113 This further narrows down the applicability of the
control test for direct liability. The more cautious approach in Chandler
is to be expected as Lord Denning’s formulation of the test is so broad
that it endangers the separate legal personality, a bedrock of corporate
law.
This new control test, however, is still subject to uncertainties as to
what will constitute the requisite control for a finding of direct liability. 114
The court did give some guidelines. First, it rejected the suggestion of a
high threshold. Although Defendant in Chandler argued that the principle
should be “absolute control” over the subsidiary by the parent, the Court
was not convinced.115 In addition, instead of looking at the relationship
between parent and subsidiary generally, the control here is “transactionspecific.”116 The Chandler court was only concerned about the extent to
which the control of the parent ended up causing the injury in question.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See supra Section II.B.2.a.
See supra Section II.B.2.b.
See supra Section II.B.2.c.
See supra Section II.A.1.
See Petrin, supra note 8, at 612-15.
Chandler v. Cape plc [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [66].
See infra note 134 and accompanying text (showing this term is borrowed from
American jurisprudence).
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Arden L.J. said that “[t]he parent company is not likely to accept
responsibility towards its subsidiary’s employees in all respects but only,
for example, in relation to what might be called high advice or
strategy.”117 The Chandler court further rejected defendant’s suggestion
of any sort of threshold test that would restrict the assumption of liability
to only matters which are “not normal” in a parent-subsidiary
relationship.118 This, to the court, was too restrictive a test, as it would not
be possible to accurately define what constitutes “normal” given that the
operations of company groups vary.119
Overall, the transaction-specific approach is an important
distinction, since the direct liability doctrine is based on the tort principle
of negligence, unlike piercing the corporate veil. As the Chandler court
stated, “[t]he development of the law of negligence has to be incremental
and the judge was in my judgment correct to hold that the analogous line
of cases in negligence to the instant case is the line of authority on the
duty of a person to intervene to prevent damage to another.”120
Furthermore, the assumption does not have to be voluntary: “The court
does not have to find that the relevant party has voluntarily assumed
responsibility . . . The word ‘assumption’ is therefore something of a
misnomer. The phrase ‘attachment’ of responsibility might be more
accurate.”121
3. Expansion by the U.K. Supreme Court in Vedanta
After Chandler, it had become apparent that English courts
recognized direct liability of the parent company for the activities of its
subsidiary.122 This principle has been further approved and expanded by

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Chandler v. Cape plc [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [66].
Id. at [67].
Id.
Id. at [63].
Id. at [64].
See AAA v. Unilever PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 1532. This matter considers a
case involving a group of employees and former employees of a Kenya-registered
subsidiary attempted to sue the English parent company in reliance on direct liability on
the part of the parent. Id. The English Court of Appeal recognised the possibility of such
liability on the part of the parent company but went on to dismiss the claimant’s appeal
by reason of proximity. Id. See also Nicole Finlayson & Charlotte Hill, Who’s Liable?,
168 NEW L.J. 7816, at 13 (2018) (summarizing and providing commentary on the
Unilever case).
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the U.K. Supreme Court in Vedanta, where it found that the direct liability
of the parent could go beyond the employees of a subsidiary to people
living in the communities surrounding to subsidiary’s operation.123 This
case was a high-profile litigation initiated in English court by some 1,826
Zambian citizens against a Zambian company (KCM), which operated a
local copper mine, and its parent company Vedanta. The claimants had
been adversely affected by the pollution and environmental damage
resulting from repeated discharge of toxic matters from the copper mine
owned and operated by KCM into certain watercourses. 124 These victims
were very poor farmers in rural areas, and the contaminated watercourses
were their only water source for drinking and irrigation.125 The lower
courts had held that Vedanta had sufficiently intervened in the activities
of its subsidiary. This point was not disputed by the Supreme Court. The
court relied on several findings in reaching this conclusion, including a
published report which “stressed that the oversight of all Vedanta’s
subsidiaries rested with the board of Vedanta itself.” The report further
described the existence of a management services agreement between
Vedanta and KCM under which the former would provide services to the
latter.126 In connection with the control test of direct liability, the Supreme
Court has substantially relaxed the test by removing much of the
constraints put into place by the Court of Appeal in Chandler.
a. Direct Liability Is Not a New Category of Duty
The Supreme Court rejected Vedanta’s argument that its case raised
“a novel and controversial extension of the boundaries of the tort of
negligence.”127 The Court posited that it was not a distinct category of
liability in the common law of negligence. Crucially, direct or indirect
ownership of one company by another merely gives rise to the chance of
such liability to appear rather than necessitating it. “Everything depends
on the extent to which . . . . the parent availed itself of the opportunity to
take over, intervene in, control, supervise or advise the management of
the relevant operations (including land use) of the subsidiary.” 128
Accordingly, the Court determined that the lower courts erred in applying

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Vedanta Res. plc v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20.
Id. at [1].
Id.
Id. at [58].
Id. at [46].
Id. at [49].
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the three-prong test of Caparo.129 This therefore removed the
requirements of proximity and justice from the test, thereby lowering the
threshold of direct liability.
The Supreme Court went on to restate the test to be solely a matter
of control:130 “In the present case the crucial question is whether Vedanta
sufficiently intervened in the management of the Mine owned by its
subsidiary KCM to have incurred, itself (rather than by vicarious
liability), a common law duty of care to the claimants ....”131 This put
control at center stage of the direct liability analysis.
b. Rejecting Pigeon-Hole Rules
The U.K. Supreme Court regarded the four indicia set out in
Chandler by Arden L.J. as “no more than particular examples of
circumstances in which a duty of care may affect a parent.”132 This
effectively removed knowledge of parent company as a necessary
consideration in finding direct liability. Likewise, the court also
acknowledged this view on the categorization of cases in AAA v. Unilever
PLC,133 while simultaneously refusing to develop more specific rules for
the parent’s direct liability:
For my part, I would be reluctant to seek to shoehorn all cases of the
parent’s liability into specific categories of that kind, helpful though
they will no doubt often be for the purposes of analysis. There is no

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

at [51].

Id. at [56].
Id. at [44].
Id.
Id. at [56].
AAA v. Unilever PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ). See also Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20
Sales LJ thought that cases where the parent might incur a duty of care
to third parties harmed by the activities of the subsidiary would
usually fall into two basic types: (i) Where the parent has in substance
taken over the management of the relevant activity of the subsidiary
in place of or jointly with the subsidiary’s own management; (ii)
Where the parent has given relevant advice to the subsidiary about
how it should manage a particular risk.

Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20 at [51].
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limit to the models of management and control which may be put in
place within a multinational group of companies.134

Taken together, these comments connotate that the court should not
be strait-jacketing itself with restrictive rules. The court’s refusal to
pigeon-hole the direct liability test changes the law from bright line rules
back to a broad standard, interestingly resembling piercing the corporate
veil back in the time of Woolfson.135
4. Further Expansion in Okpabi
In the latest direct liability case, Okpabi, the U.K. Supreme Court
adopted an even broader approach.136 The court reemphasized that there
is no pigeon-hole rule and confirmed that control may be satisfied by
holding out.
By way of background, this proceeding stemmed from numerous oil
spills which were alleged to have occurred because of the negligence of
the oil pipelines operator, a Nigerian subsidiary of Respondent RDS. 137
Consequently, “natural water sources [located] in the appellant
communities [could not] be safely used for drinking, fishing, agricultural,
washing or recreational purposes.”138 Claimants argued that RDS directs,
controls, and intervenes in the management of subsidiary’s operation, and
therefore owed them a duty of care. The Supreme Court observed several
errors of law in the Court of Appeal’s analysis and clarified certain
principles.
a. Further Rejecting Pigeon-Hole Rules
Disapproving of the Court of Appeal’s attempt to establish a
categorical rule, the U.K. Supreme Court refused to do so. Lord Hamblen
rightly remarked the argument that “the promulgation by a parent
company of group wide policies or standards can never in itself give rise
to a duty of care . . . is inconsistent with Vedanta.”139 This is in line with
Lord Brigg’s refusal to recognize there being such a “limiting principle.”
Similarly, although the Supreme Court was fine with the appellants
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20 at [51].
See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
See Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell plc [2021] UKSC 3.
Id. at [4]-[5].
See id.
Id. at [7].
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presenting their arguments with refence to the four Vedanta indicia,140 it
emphasized that they were no more than “convenient headings.”141
b. Holding Out May Be Sufficient
Lord Hamblen sought to give more guidelines on the control test. In
the same vein as Vedanta’s holding,142 “the issue is the extent to which
the parent did take over or share with the subsidiary the management of
the relevant activity” which may or may not be demonstrated by the
parent controlling the subsidiary. Building on this control test, the
Supreme Court expanded the concept of control beyond the actual
exercise of control, again with reference to Vedanta. A specific example
of a case in which a duty of care may arise regardless of the exercise of
control is provided in Vedanta route (4):143
[T]he parent may incur the relevant responsibility to third parties if,
in published materials, it holds itself out as exercising that degree of
supervision and control of its subsidiaries, even if it does not in fact
do so. In such circumstances its very omission may constitute the
abdication of a responsibility which it has publicly undertaken.144

This expansion of holding out is analogous to promissory estoppel and no
doubt makes direct liability even broader.
In summary, from the promising idea in Lubbe to eventual
refinements in Vedanta and Okpabi, English courts have steadily
recreated a tool to counter abuse of the corporate form that focuses on
control. The two recent Supreme Court cases show a clear intention by
the court to revert the test to a broad, standard-based approach instead of
shackling it to a bright line rule.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at [26].
Id. at [27].
See Vedanta Res. plc v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [49].
See id. at [26]. The other three routes argued by the claimants are “(1) RDS
taking over the management or joint management of the relevant activity of SPDC; (2)
RDS providing defective advice and/or promulgating defective group-wide
safety/environmental policies which were implemented as of course by SPDC; (3) RDS
promulgating group-wide safety/environmental policies and taking steps to ensure their
implementation by SPDC.” Id. at [26]. The UK Supreme Court however noted that these
routes were just “convenient headings” and do not constitute any new test in finding duty
of care. Id. at [27].
144. See id. at [148] (citing Lord Briggs in Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20 at [53]).
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C. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL AND DIRECT
LIABILITY UNDER ENGLISH LAW
Although results yielded by applying the principle of direct liability
are in effect identical to that of piercing the corporate veil, judges have
quite robustly and expressly rejected defining the situation as such.145 The
vehement insistence to distinguish the two concepts leaves one to ponder
the precise differences between them.
To begin with, the principle of direct liability only applies to tort
cases.146 In other words, it is a creative application of tort law to solve a
company law problem. All landmark cases on direct liability boil down
to the same storyline: claimants were tort victims who sued the
tortfeasors’ parent companies with deeper pockets by attempting to
establish a duty of care owed by them.147 In Lubbe, the claimants were
residents who suffered personal injuries or death as a result of the
exposure to asbestos.148 In Chandler, the action was started by a group of
employees who endured personal injuries, again, due to their exposure to
asbestos. In contrast, all kinds of disputes give rise to the stream of
piercing corporate veil cases, ranging from contractual to matrimonial
disputes.149
Second, the key test for applying direct liability is the level of control
instead of impropriety.150 As discussed in the foregoing,151 assumption of
responsibility by the parent company is required to trigger application of
direct liability. Assumption of responsibility in turn depends on the extent
of control exerted by the parent company.152 Consequently, it is
unnecessary to delve into intention of the parent company in setting up
the company or the purpose of adopting a particular management
structure when determining direct liability.
145.
146.

See Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [69].
Assumption of liability is a doctrine of tort law. Consistent with that
categorization, all cases of direct liability to date are tort cases.
147. See generally Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525; Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20;
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell plc [2021] UKSC 3.
148. Lubbe v. Cape plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545, at 1550 (HL).
149. See, e.g., Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne [1933] 1 Ch 935 (explaining that the
dispute arose out of a non-competition clause contained in an employment contract);
Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd. [2013] UKSC 34, [35] (dealing with a matrimonial action);
Lee v. Lee’s Air Farming Ltd. [1960] All ER 420 (PC) (appeal taken from the Court of
Appeal of New Zealand) (dealing with a claim for an employee’s compensation).
150. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
151. See supra Section II.B.2.a.
152. See Petrin, supra note 8, at 612.
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Third, contrary to piercing the corporate veil, direct liability requires
no distinction between evasion and avoidance of liability, which was itself
an unsettled position in Prest.153 To establish direct liability, so long as
the required level of control is found, it is irrelevant whether the
subsidiary was set up before the liability was incurred.154 There is no need
for any “injustice” or blameworthiness that characterizes evasion.155
Thus, as far as tort law is concerned, direct liability can be seen as
an alternative to the narrowing piercing the corporate veil doctrine. In
fact, bypassing piercing the corporate veil is not an unfamiliar concept
and has occurred in other contexts, such as in two Hong Kong cases
penned by Lord Millett.156
Sui Kwan v. Kwan Lai concerns a jurisdictional dispute in the
liquidation context.157 In this case, there was a winding up petition before
the Hong Kong Court against the ultimate holding company of two Hong
Kong subsidiaries that operated a renowned local restaurant for
decades.158 The ultimate holding company was incorporated in the British
Virgin Islands (BVI) which held the operating Hong Kong companies
through a chain of subsidiaries and ran no substantial business by itself.159
The complicated corporate structure led on a discussion of whether the
Hong Kong Court had jurisdiction to make a winding up order against the
BVI parent company under the relevant statute.160 The Court of Final
Appeal held that the Hong Kong Court had jurisdiction since the BVI
parent company had sufficient connection with Hong Kong.161 Central to
this discussion, the court found that it is possible to establish sufficient
connection between a company and a jurisdiction through its shareholders
or subsidiaries.162 In effect, this practice is a form of overlooking the
separate legal personality between the two entities. Though Lord Millett
specifically held that this was not an attempt “to lift the corporate veil”
and the holding “d[id] not ignore the fundamental principle that a
153.
154.
155.
156.

See Allan, supra note 5.
See Petrin, supra note 8, at 612.
Id.
See Sui Kwan v. Kwan Lai, [2015] 18 H.K.C.F.A.R. 501 (the judgment was
coauthored with Ma CJ); Waddington Ltd. v. Chun Hoo, [2008] 11 H.K.C.F.A.R. 370.
157. [2015] 18 H.K.C.F.A.R. 501.
158. Id. at 513.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 523-26.
161. Id. at 526.
162. Id. at 524-25.
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company is separate and distinct from its shareholders,” the end results
were of no practical difference.163
The other case on point is Waddington Ltd. v. Chun Hoo.164 This is a
Hong Kong case on multiple derivative actions.165 The Court of Final
Appeal was faced with the issue of whether a member of a holding
company could bring proceedings against its related company’s
director.166 It was in Lord Millet’s opinion that “the question is simply one
of [locus standi],”167 and on such question “the court must ask itself
whether the plaintiff has a legitimate interest in the relief claimed
sufficient to justify him in bringing proceedings to obtain it.”168 Under
this set of facts, the court held that depletion of a subsidiary’s assets
caused indirect but real loss to the parent company and thus allowed the
proceedings to carry on.169 Most crucially, Lord Millet again declined to
recognize this as an exercise of piercing the corporate veil, despite the
practical effect of allowing members of a related company to stand in the
shoes of the members of the relevant company.170
III. U.S. LAW
This Part provides a brief summary of the piercing the corporate veil
and the direct liability doctrines under U.S. law. Since both doctrines
about governed by state laws, they have not been developed in stages as
clearly as their English counterparts.
A. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Although there is variation among states, the relevant U.S. law
concerning piercing the corporate veil can be summarized into a threepronged standard: the “mere instrumentality” test, the “injustice” test, and
the “proximate cause” test.171 In conjunction with this formulation are

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 524.
[2008] 11 H.K.C.F.A.R. 370.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 394-95.
See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:6 (2020-2021).
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laundry lists of characteristics and behaviors that courts have employed
to help decide whether the tests are satisfied.172
The first test, mere instrumentality, necessitates the subsidiary being
excessively controlled by its parent company such that the business entity
has “no separate mind or will of its own.”173 However, it has been
repeatedly affirmed in different cases that mere control is not the whole
picture.174 There must exist some kind of inappropriateness and actual
harm caused to the plaintiff, which leads to the remaining two tests.175
The second test, the injustice test, entails a parent company’s use of
the subsidiary as a channel that is somehow unjust, fraudulent, or
wrongful towards the plaintiff.176 More intuitively titled, this “fairness” 177
prong looks to the fundamental issue of fairness in the context of the facts
and asks whether an inequitable result will occur if the business entity is
not pierced.178 In contemplating the factors and scenarios relevant in this
inquiry, Professor Frederick Powell outlined numerous instances of
injustice where that would be sufficient to fulfill this prong.179 These
circumstances include the use of the subsidiary by the parent in a way that
amounts to fraud, violation of a statute, and commission of a tort.180 As
these extensive lists of potential considerations show, the flip side of
having such an expanded system is the “messiness” that comes with it.181
The third and final test, that of proximate cause, requires the plaintiff
to have actually suffered some harm. It is less important than the first two
tests and some states formulate their rules without incorporating it.182

172. See Christopher W. Peterson, Piercing the Corporate Veil by Tort Creditors, 13
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 63, 72 (2017).
173. United States v. Tailwinds Sports Corp., 51 F. Supp. 3d 9, 62 (D.D.C. 2014).
174. See, e.g., Main Bank of Chicago v. Baker, 86 Ill. 2d 188, 205 (1981) (“[I]t must
further appear that observance of the fiction of separate existence would, under the
circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote injustice”).
175. Id.
176. See PRESSER, supra note 171.
177. See Peterson, supra note 172, at 71-72; d’Elia v. Rice Dev., 147 P.3d 515, 521
(Utah Ct. App. 2006).
178. Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
179. See PRESSER, supra note 171.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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B. DIRECT LIABILITY
1. U.S. Direct Liability Doctrine
In the United States, alongside the popular doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil, is also the well-established principle of direct liability.
Almost a century ago, then-Professor and later Judge William O. Douglas
and Professor Carrol Shanks co-wrote an article titled Insulation from
Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, which stated that a parent
company would usually not be responsible for its subsidiary’s liability if
it complied with four standards relating to corporate relationships:
(1) A separate financial unit should be set up and maintained . . . . (2)
The day to day business of the two units should be kept separate . . . .
(3) The formal barriers between the two management structures
should be maintained . . . . (4) The two units should be represented as
being one unit.183

Compliance with these standards would also save the parent from
having its subsidiary’s veil being pierced because it would help the parent
avoid getting caught into the control prong.184
However, the article also identified an exception to the separate legal
personality based on direct liability even if the four standards of corporate
formalities are met.185 This is when “the alleged wrong can seemingly be
traced to the parent through the conduit of its own personnel and
management.”186 This point was further deliberated by Judge Learned
Hand of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
One corporation may, however, become an actor in a given
transaction, or in part of a business, or in whole business, and, when
it has, will be legally responsible. To become so it must take
immediate direction of the transaction through its officers, by whom
alone it can act at all.187

Over the years, there have been plenty of cases applying this
doctrine. For example, Professor Phillip Blumberg highlighted a number
183. William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 196-97 (1929).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 208.
186. Id.
187. Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d
Cir. 1929).
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of intellectual property cases applying this direct liability principle.188
Yet, the most important development of the doctrine came when the U.S.
Supreme Court expressly recognized it in United States v. Bestfoods.189
Justice Souter, who delivered the judgment, cited Justice Douglas and
Professor Shanks’ abovementioned opinion.190 To successfully hold the
parent directly liable, the Court posited that the “critical question” is
“whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the facility by an agent
of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted norms of parental
oversight of a subsidiary’s facility.”191 The Court added, however, that a
normal level of control exercised will not suffice for this purpose.192
Rather, an “eccentric” or abnormal level of control is the key.193 In
addition, common management or directorship will not generally cause a
finding of direct liability, and an officer who wears two hats would be
assumed to have picked up a role in the subsidiary.194 Bestfoods is a case
concerning violations of the federal Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).195 After the
decision, courts sought to apply the direct liability doctrine in other
federal statutes.196 For example, in Pearson v. Component Technology
Corp., the Third Circuit dealt with a labor relations dispute arising under
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.197
188. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Problems of Parent &
Subsidiary Corporations Under Statutory Law of General Application, 273-74, 298-99,
321-22, 338-42 (1989), cited in Esmark v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 756 (7th Cir. 1989).
189. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
190. Id. at 61.
191. Id. at 72.
192. Id. (asserting no direct liability will be found on the basis of control that is
“consistent with the parent’s investor status, such as monitoring of the subsidiary’s
performance, supervision of the subsidiary’s finance and capital budget decisions, and
articulation of general policies and procedures”).
193. Id. (“The critical question is whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the
facility by an agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted norms of parental
oversight of a subsidiary’s facility.”).
194. See id.
195. Id. at 51.
196. See Esmark, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 887 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying direct
liability in the context of the National Labor Relations Act).
197. 247 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 2001). See also City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112
B.R. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying direct liability in the context of environmental law
violation and founding liability on the parent based on its “degree of control over and
actual participation by the corporate officer or shareholder in the affairs of the
corporation.”).
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In Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc.,198 the Illinois Supreme Court
expanded the direct liability doctrine into a general principle beyond the
context of federal statutes.199 The Forsythe judgment carefully examined
important authorities and gave further guidance on the application.200 The
case arose from a refinery fire that killed two workers who were eating in
a lunchroom across the street.201 The deceaseds’ families sued the parent
company (Clark USA) that owned the refinery under the doctrine of direct
liability.202 Plaintiffs alleged that Clark USA ordered extreme budget cuts
which led to unreasonable cost cutting in the maintenance department and
eventually the accident.203 Clark USA argued that overseeing budget is an
exercise of normal level of control expected of a parent, an argument
supported by the Bestfoods Court, where such behavior was expressly
held to be an acceptable shareholder practice that did not impose direct
liability.204 However, the Illinois Supreme Court disagreed holding that
Clark USA’s mandate of the “survival mode” budget plan which led to
reduced safety measures should be regarded as “eccentric” under the
standard set out in Bestfoods.205 Accordingly, Plaintiffs had made
sufficient allegations to fend off a summary judgment and have the case
remanded.206
In establishing this decision, the Forsythe Court identified two key
elements of establishing direct liability: first “a parent’s specific direction
or authorization of the manner in which an activity is undertaken”207 and,
second, foreseeability that injury would result from such direction.208 It is
noteworthy, however, that in the concurring judgment, Justice Freeman
attempted to play down the potential floodgate effect on limited liability
by opining that the decision “does not alter the bedrock principle of

198.
199.

224 Ill. 2d 274 (2007).
Prior to the case, direct liability was generally applied in finding liability of the
parent company under federal statutes. See Pearson, 247 F.3d at 487 (“[D]irect liability
is rarely used independently to hold parents liable for their subsidiary’s actions.”).
200. Forsythe v. Clark USA, 224 Ill. 2d 274, 282-92 (2007).
201. Forsythe v. Clark USA, 361 Ill. App. 3d 642, 643-44 (2005).
202. Id. at 644.
203. Forsythe, 224 Ill. 2d at 278.
204. Id. at 282.
205. Id. at 290.
206. See id. at 293-95.
207. Id. at 290.
208. See id.
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limited liability for corporate shareholders, and that direct participant
liability is a very narrow exception to this general principle.”209
In addition, direct liability focuses on a particular act of the
subsidiary resulting from the control of the parent, but not general
domination by the parent. The latter would fall into the instrumentality
prong of piercing the corporate veil under U.S. law.210 As the Illinois
Court of Appeals stated, direct liability “does not depend upon large-scale
disregard of corporate formalities, but is transaction-specific.”211 The
Third Circuit even determined that direct liability was “function[ing]
essentially as a kind of ‘transaction-specific’ alter ego theory.”212 That
said, without the injustice prong, this analogy is hardly helpful, if not
misleading since injustice is an essential element to the piercing doctrine
under U.S. law.213
2. A U.S. Alternative: The Good Samaritan Rule
Under U.S. law, there is another body of law that holds parent
companies liable for the actions of a subsidiary.214 This is known as the
“Good Samaritan Rule” and it is based on Section 324A of the
Restatement Second of Torts (“Restatement Second”).215 The
Restatement Second has been adopted in most states.216 It has a longer
history than the U.S. direct liability rule and has been said to trace all the

209.
210.

Id. at 302-03.
See Good v. Am. Water Works Co., No. 14-01374, 2016 WL 5402230, at *9 (S.
D. W. Va. Sept. 26, 2016).
211. United States v. All Meat and Poultry Prod. Stored at Lagrou Cold Storage, 470
F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
212. See Am. Water Works Co., 2016 WL 5402230, at *9.
213. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
214. Despite the similarities between direct liability and the “Good Samaritan” rule,
courts clearly regard them as separate doctrines. See, e.g., Born v. Simonds Intern., 26
Mass.L.Rptr. 416, at *5 (Supp. Ct. 2009) (recognizing that the plaintiff only relied on
direct liability but not the Good Samaritan Rule nor piercing the corporate veil).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A(b) (AM. L. INST. 1965).
216. See Nicole Rosenkrantz, The Parent Trap: Using the Good Samaritan Doctrine
to Hold Parent Corporations Directly Liable for Their Negligence, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1061,
1061 (1996). See also Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348, 135253 (D. Md. 1982) (noting that, even though Maryland had not specially endorsed Section
324A of the Restatement Second, the court had no difficulty finding the Good Samaritan
Rule applied in Maryland).
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way back to the English case Coggs v. Bernard.217 In that case, a person
who volunteered to move casks of brandy was found liable to the owner
when he spilt much of the brandy during transport.218 To satisfy the rule
in the parent-subsidiary context, there must be an undertaking by the
parent to the subsidiary to perform certain acts, and it is foreseeable that
the parent’s negligence in performing the act will lead to harm to the third
party.219 Whether such an undertaking exists is a question of fact, and
courts generally look at a number of factors, including the parent’s scope
of involvement, the extent of its authority, and its underlying intent.220
The threshold to find the undertaking is a high one.221 In Muniz v. National
Can Corp.,222 the First Circuit said it would not “lightly assume that a
parent corporation has agreed to accept this responsibility . . . the
subsidiary’s employee must show some proof of a positive undertaking
by the parent corporation.”223
In addition, the plaintiff must prove one of three elements: (1) the
parent’s failure to exercise reasonable care increased the risk of such
harm; (2) that the parent had undertaken to perform a duty owed by the
subsidiary to the third party; or (3) the harm was suffered because of
reliance of the plaintiff or the subsidiary upon the parent’s undertaking. 224
Like direct liability, the Good Samaritan doctrine is based on tort and does
not require piercing the corporate veil to find liability on the part of the
parent.225 Despite the long-lived status of the rule, it is said to be a “rarely
217. (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107; 2 Ld. Raym. 909. See Annette T. Crawley,
Environmental Auditing and the “Good Samaritan” Doctrine: Implications for Parent
Corporations, 28 GA. L. REV. 223, 234 (1999) (cited in approval by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Bujol v. Entergy Servs., 922 So.2d 1113, 1128 (La. 2004)).
218. Coggs (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. at 107.
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A(b) (AM. L. INST. 1965). See Rick v.
RLC Corp., 535 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (finding no liability on the parent for
plaintiff’s failure to prove parent specifically agreed or intended to provide services for
the primary benefits of the plaintiffs).
220. Bujol v. Entergy Servs., 922 So.2d 1113, 1131 (La. 2004).
221. See Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cir.1976, 525 F.2d 1204, 1208.
222. 737 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1984).
223. Id. at 148.
224. See id.
225. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 216, at 1087.

Despite the common element of control, these two paths to
shareholder liability are quite different. Whereas Section 324A
focuses on a parent corporation’s independent duty owed to the
plaintiffs, veil piercing focuses on the relationship between the parent
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used and relatively insignificant cause of action”; however, it gained
popularity in the 1980s as employees used the doctrine bring claims
against employers concerning occupational safety.226 Even so, these cases
were not always successful due to the high standard required by the
doctrine.227 As stated by the court in Amfac Foods v. International
Systems & Controls Corp.,228 “disregard of a legal established corporate
entity is an extraordinary remedy which exists as a last resort.”229 More
recently, in Bujol v. Entergy Services, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that, to satisfy the Good Samaritan doctrine, it is necessary to prove that
the parent’s undertaking is not just supplemental but supplants the
subsidiary’s duty to the plaintiffs.230 In that case, Plaintiff’s claim failed
because the Court found that the subsidiary had its own safety
management in place and set its own safety rules, while the parent did not
compel the subsidiary to comply with the guidelines it set.231

corporation and the subsidiary, particularly, whether the two
corporations were maintained as separate legal enterprises. Unlike
veil piercing, Section 324A is not based on a parent’s control over its
subsidiary but rather on a parent’s affirmative rendering of services to
its subsidiary . . . . Even if the subsidiary was not formed or used for
an improper, fraudulent or unjust purpose, the subsidiary corporation
may be disregarded and the parent shareholder may be subject to
liability under Section 324A.
Id. See also Andrew J. Natale, Expansion of Parent Corporate Shareholder Liability
through the Good Samaritan Doctrine – A Parent Corporation’s Duty to Provide a Safe
Workplace for Employees of its Subsidiary, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 717, 728-29, 734 (1988).
226. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 216, at 1062.
227. See id. at 1063.
228. 654 P.2d 1092 (Or. 1982).
229. Id. at 1098.
230. See Bujol v. Entergy Servs., 922 So.2d 1113, 1136 (La. 2004).
Section 324A might be met if a parent only takes over one aspect of
the subsidiary’s duty to provide a safe workplace, such as for the . . .
safety of a particular piece of equipment rather than safety of the entire
plant, but it is still necessary that the parent supplant the subsidiary’s
duty with respect to that aspect completely.
Id. See also Root v. Stahl Scott Fetzer Co., 88 N.E.3d 980, 991 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017);
Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348, 1355 (1982).
231. See Bujol, 922 So.2d at 1136.
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IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND U.S. LAWS
In this Part, the piercing doctrine of English and U.S. laws will first
be compared. This comparison is essential as the piercing doctrines shape
the development of direct liability within their respective jurisdictions.
This is followed by a comparison between English direct liability doctrine
and its U.S. counterpart. Finally, the English direct liability doctrine will
be compared with the similar Good Samaritan Rule.
A. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
1. The Injustice Prong
The inadequacy of weight given to equity under the current English
piercing doctrine is especially ostensible when compared with the U.S.
position. To begin, the scope of the U.S. piercing doctrine is significantly
wider than that under English law. As opposed to the English evasion
principle, for example, it is not necessary for the “errant” party to have
willfully wronged the other party or engaged in anything amounting to
fraud in their relationship for the doctrine to apply under U.S. law: “[t]he
essence . . . is simply that an individual businessman cannot hide from the
normal consequences of carefree entrepreneuring by doing so through a
corporate shell.”232
Equity is the main theme that underpins the entire U.S. piercing
doctrine.233 Many scholars have agreed that the U.S. courts generally yield
the just result.234 Undoubtedly, the U.S. courts have expanded the piercing
doctrine significantly beyond the parameters outlined by the English
courts.
2. The Instrumentality Prong
Compared to the English law of piercing, the instrumentality prong
resembles the now defunct test under D.H.N., though the focus is actual
control rather than de jure control.235 Regarding the second prong, the
current English rule is much narrower, as it covers only the evasion

232.
233.
234.
235.

Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
See Tsang, supra note 7, at 247.
See Peterson, supra note 172, at 94.
See PRESSER, supra note 171. None of the questions in Powell’s laundry list
involves de jure control.
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scenario, which is just one of the many scenarios that the injustice prong
usually covers.236 Yet, the English test is much easier to satisfy if the case
falls into the evasion scenario, and there is no need to prove excessive
control.237
3. The Proximity Prong
The proximity prong is not a stated requisite for establishing piercing
under English law. However, the prong is also relatively unimportant
under U.S. law; there has been criticism of its elusive nature and some
U.S. jurisdictions have disapproved of its use.238 For example, Illinois
adopted a two-prong test that requires proof of excessive control and
injustice, while omitting the proximity requirement.239
Despite having to overcome the hurdles of instrumentality and
proximity, plaintiffs in the United States manage to pierce the corporate
veil of many more subsidiaries than their English counterparts.240 Given
the very narrow scope of the piercing doctrine in England and the
requirement that it must only be utilized as the last resort, this technical
comparison is not the most relevant in practice. Ultimately, the most
meaningful distinction between them is that the U.S. doctrine is very
much alive, and the English is essentially a vestigial organ. Since Prest,
there has yet to be a successful piercing case in England.241 In the United
States however, piercing the corporate veil not only has long been
considered the most litigated matter,242 it also has a high success rate.243
There is no sign that the piercing doctrine is slowing down in the United
States.

236. Id. The evasion envisaged under English law can be fit with one of the seven
scenarios set out by Powell, namely, whether the parent’s use of the subsidiary amount
to actual fraud.
237. See Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd. [2013] UKSC 34, [28].
238. See PRESSER, supra note 171.
239. Id. at § 2:14.
240. See Thompson, supra note 1.
241. See Hurstwood Properties v. Rossendale Borough Council [2021] UKSC 16
(Eng.) (serving as the latest failed attempt to pierce corporate veil).
242. See Thompson, supra note 1.
243. Id. at 1048 (finding that the veil piercing success rate is 40.18%).
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B. DIRECT LIABILITY
1. Comparing Direct liability Between English and U.S. Laws
At first glance, it appears as though the U.S. direct liability principle
is quite similar to its English counterpart. First, both are based on tort law.
For example, subsequent cases have made it clear that direct liability
cannot be applied to contracts,244 and rightly so since that would “make a
corporation that is not a signatory to a contract a de facto party to the
contract.”245 Second, the test is based on actual control exercised by the
parent.246 Third, the control in question is transaction-specific.247
However, the U.S. principle may not be as “direct” as the English
doctrine. Unlike in England, direct liability in the United States is not an
individual investigation into the act of the parent company that caused
harm to the plaintiff. Such individual investigation would render it
unnecessary to consider the action of the subsidiary.248 Rather, the U.S.
doctrine is about how the parent, through the use of its control,
manipulated the subsidiary to commit the tortious act:249
In these cases the shareholder or parent corporation was not held
“directly” liable for its own independently wrongful acts. The parent
corporation did not, side-by-side or concurrently with its subsidiary,
directly cause an injury to the third-party/victim . . . . There was no
allegation that the parent did anything directly to the third party.
Instead the parent only acted against the third party’s interests through
the agency of the subsidiary. The owner’s liability was based on its
control of its subsidiaries’ actions from “behind the scenes.” Thus the

244. See Northbound Grp. v. Norvax, 795 F.3d 647, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2015); Bos. Fish
Mkt. v. EMS-USA Insulated Door, No. 12C6751, 2013 WL 2421744, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
June 3, 2013). See also Todd v. Xoom Energy Md., No. GJH-15-154, 2016 WL 727108,
at *7 (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2016); Phillips v. WellPoint, No. 10-CV-00357, 2012 WL
6111405, at *10 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2012).
245. Cima v. Wellpoint Health Networks, 556 F. Supp. 2d 901, 906 (S.D. Ill. 2008).
For the English position, see supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
246. See Golbert v. Aurora Chi. Lakeshore Hosp., No. 19-CV-08257, 2021 WL
952528, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2021). For the English position, see supra notes 150-52
and accompanying text.
247. Esmark v. N.L.R.B., 887 F.2d 739, 756 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Forsythe v.
Clark USA, 224 N.E.2d 274, 284 (Ill. 2007). For the English position, see supra notes
116-17 and accompanying text.
248. See Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 487 (3d Cir. 2001).
249. Esmark, 887 F.2d at 739.
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parent was not held “direct liable”; it was liable derivatively for
transactions of its subsidiary in which the parent interposed a guiding
hand.250

It is also for this reason that direct liability, like piercing the
corporate veil, is not recognized as a cause of action under U.S. law.251
Having said that, this difference is more theoretical than substantive since
both approaches examine control and lead to the parent being liable to the
third party. The real deviation lies in how courts define the level of control
that will trigger direct liability. This is illustrated by Forsythe.
It is unclear if English courts would find Clark USA directly liable
under the English direct liability test. As stated above, the English Court
of Appeal in Chandler rejected a threshold test requiring abnormal
control.252 Effectively, the English court preferred a more liberal standard
than the “eccentric” control required under the U.S. direct liability rule.
This makes the English doctrine seemingly broader than the U.S. direct
liability doctrine.
2. Comparing English Direct Liability and U.S. Good Samaritan Rule
Looking at the substance of the English direct liability rule, it seems
to be broad enough to cover the facts in Bujol, which applied the Good
Samaritan Rule. First, the basis of the English rule is Dorset Yacht Co.253
As highlighted above, the Home Office had control of the boys.254 Unlike
250.
251.

Id. at 756.
United States v. All Meat and Poultry Prod. Stored at Lagrou Cold Storage, 470
F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2007). One commentator has argued that direct liability
resembles veil-piercing not only in the result, but elements considered including the
injustice prong: “The second veil piercing factor—the fiction of separate entities is a
fraud, injustice, or promotes inequitable consequences—incorporates the concept
inherent in tort law of remedying the consequences of an unjustifiable action.” See Matt
Schweiger, Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc.: Contradictions in Parent Corporation Liability
in Illinois, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1105-06 (2009). While there is some truth in this
statement, all laws seek to address injustice. This is too much a stretch to say that the two
doctrines are similar in terms of the text when one expressly requires the presence of
injustice while the other does not.
252. See Chandler v. Cape plc [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [66].
253. Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office [1970] HL 1004 (AC) at 1026 (Engl.).
254. Id.
The facts which I think we must assume are that this party of trainees
were in the lawful custody of the governor of the Portland Borstal
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in Coggs, where there was a voluntary acceptance of extra responsibility,
the Home Office in Dorset Yacht Co had supervisor responsibility from
the outset.255 In addition, the actual test focuses simply on control without
any express requirement on undertaking, unlike what is stipulated under
Section 324A of the Restatement Second. For example, one of the four
indicia identified in Chandler was the parent’s superior knowledge of the
relevant industry,256 even though the knowledge factor is no longer
considered a prerequisite.257 However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
made it clear that such superior knowledge would not create a duty on the
parent.258 To put it another way, plaintiffs in situations similar to Chandler
are unlikely to establish assumption of duty under the Good Samaritan
Rule in the United States. Accordingly, without the requirement of an
explicit assumption of duty, English direct liability is substantially
broader than the Good Samaritan Rule. It follows that a parent company
under the English rule may not seek to prevent liability by avoiding the
prescription of any group policy that might be interpreted as covering the
employees or other third-party creditors in the first place.
C. A SUMMARY OF THE COMPARISON
In summary, unlike either the U.S. direct liability rule or the Good
Samaritan Rule, which both require affirmative acts by the parent, English
courts seem to have taken the doctrine a step further by considering the
parent’s omission to be sufficient for finding direct liability.259 However,
there are a limited number of authorities on the subject, with only
Chandler making it to trial.260 Further, with the U.K. Supreme Court’s
decision in departing from the Caparo test in Chandler, it is still very

institution and were sent by him to Brownsea Island on a training
exercise in the custody and under the control of the three officers with
instructions to keep them in custody and under control.
Id.

255.
256.
257.

See Petrin, supra note 8, at 613-14.
See Chandler v. Cape plc [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [80].
AAA v. Unilever PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ). See also Vedanta Res. plc v.
Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [51].
258. See Bujol v. Entergy Servs., 922 So.2d 1113, 1133 (La. 2004).
259. See Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20 at [49].
260. Vedanta and Okpabi are all cases dealing with jurisdiction. Vedanta Res. plc v.
Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20; Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell plc [2021] UKSC 3.
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much a question as to how the English courts will apply the ever more
elusive direct liability test.261
Following Forsythe, there have been a number of cases applying the
direct liability doctrine. Given the Illinois Supreme Court’s strong
adoption of the doctrine, it is not surprising that many of the relevant
direct liability cases are from Illinois.262 For example, in Golbert v.
Aurora Chicago Lakeshore Hospital,263 it was alleged that the parent
company of a hospital was liable to patients who suffered sexual abuses
while under the hospital’s care.264 The court attributed direct liability to
an aggressive budget plan by the parent that resulted in a failure to install
surveillance cameras or train the staff properly.265 The motion to dismiss
was therefore denied.266 The direct liability doctrine also makes an
appearance in West Virginia where the West Virginia Supreme Court
approved of Forsythe and applied its analysis of the doctrine in Good v.
American Water Works Co.267 That being said, the direct liability test is
not universally welcomed. Some states, such as Mississippi and New
York, have either doubted or reluctantly applied the standard doctrine,
and have been especially hesitant of the test as articulated in Forsythe.268
261.
262.

See supra Section II.B.3.
See, e.g., Golbert v. Aurora Chi. Lakeshore Hosp., No. 19-CV-08257, 2021 WL
952528 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2021). See also Santora v. Starwood Hotel & Resorts
Worldwide, No. 05 C 6391, 2007 WL 3037098 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2007); Northbound
Grp. v. Norvax, 795 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2015); Cima v. Wellpoint Health Networks, 556
F. Supp. 2d 901 (S.D. Ill. 2008); Non-Surgical Orthopedics P.A. v. Allscripts Healthcare
Solutions, No. 18 C 566, 2019 WL 2357030 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2019); Bos. Fish Mkt. v.
EMS-USA Insulated Door, No. 12 C 6751, 2013 WL 2421744 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Phillips
v. WellPoint, No. 10-CV-00357-JPG, 2012 WL 6111405 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2012); Grady
v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, No. 11-CV-1531, 2012 WL 929928 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2012);
Nelson v. Aurora Equipment Co., 391 Ill. App. 3d 1036 (2009).
263. No. 19-CV-08257, 2021 WL 952528.
264. Id. at *2
265. See id. at *4.
266. Id.
267. No. CV 2:14-013742016, WL 5402230 at *3.
268. See Melton Properties v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., No. 18-CV-79 DMB-JMV,
2019 WL 6039967, at *6-7 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 14, 2019) (noting that Forsythe is not
binding in Mississippi and opted not to decide on whether Mississippi would recognize
a forced-action theory of direct liability). See also Gunther v. Capital One, 703 F. Supp.
2d 264, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“It is the basic rule of the corporate form that shareholders
are not liable for the acts of a corporation unless there is a reason to lift the corporate veil.
This is not avoided by merely asserting that a shareholder authorized, ratified, or directed
the actions of the corporation.”); Born v. Simonds Intern., Corp., 26 Mass.L.Rptr. 416, at
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Like piercing the corporate veil, direct liability remains a matter of state
law. Similarly, the Good Samaritan Rule has not gained universal
acceptance in the United States. There are probably even fewer states
adopting that rule.269 However, more recently, since the Louisiana
Supreme Court formally adopted the rule, there have been an increasing
number of Louisiana cases applying it.270 Thus, while there are some
recent expansions of the two doctrines in individual states, a wholesale
favoring of direct liability over piercing the corporate veil in the United
States, as has occurred in England, is unlikely.
V. ASSESSMENT OF DIRECT LIABILITY
Even though the direct liability doctrines under U.S. and English
laws are trending in different directions, the comparison in Part IV shows
that they are substantially similar to be categorized under the same
umbrella. This Part further analyzes the direct liability doctrine from the
perspectives of equity and certainty, two of the key considerations when
piercing the corporate veil.
A. EQUITY
For years, Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman
advocated that involuntary creditors do not have the ability to assess the
risks they took in dealing with a firm nor to “contract out” limited liability
if those risks seemed excessive.271 On that account, they asserted that in
tort cases, a proportional liability should be attached to the shareholder
instead of limited liability.272 It has been argued that if this concept is
considered in tandem with the piercing doctrine, courts should be more
*6 (Supp. Ct. 2009) (“[The Massachusetts] court has some unease as to whether the
Illinois Supreme Court fairly applied the teaching of Bestfoods, in adopting its theory of
direct participant liability and applying it to the summary judgment record in Forsythe.”).
269. See Muniz v. Nat’l Can Corp., 737 F.2d 145, 147-48 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding the
Good Samaritan Rule valid under Puerto Rican law).
270. Although the Louisiana Court stated that the Good Samaritan Rule had a long
history in the United States, Louisiana Supreme Court had never encountered a case
involving the Rule until Bujol in 2004. See Bujol v. Entergy Servs., 922 So.2d 1113, 1128
(La. 2004). For a subsequent Louisiana case applying the rule, see Root v. Stahl Scott
Fetzer Co., 88 N.E.3d 980 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).
271. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880 (1991).
272. Id. See also Ewan McGaughey, Donoghue v. Salomon in the High Court, J. PERS.
INJ. L. 249, 260-61 (2011).
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lenient when it comes to tort creditors and more willing to pierce the
corporate veil; this is particularly true, the commentator contends, when
compared with contract creditors who could conduct “self-help,” such as
asking for a guarantee or security from the shareholder.273 Yet, despite
calls for flexibility, empirical research in the United States and England
shows that courts have not been more willing to pierce the corporate veil
in tort cases than contract cases.274
In the United States, while some courts have stated that piercing the
corporate veil is more difficult in the case of contract law,275 others have
expressly stated that they will apply the same standard to both tort and
contract cases.276 Direct liability (including the Good Samaritan Rule) can
be an additional avenue for tort creditors to access justice against the
parent company. It is therefore not surprising that direct liability and the
Good Samaritan Rule flourished in states with stricter piercing rules. By
way of example, it has been said that Illinois’ piercing rule is one of the
stricter in the nation.277 Since the Illinois Supreme Court adoption of the
direct liability rule in Forsythe, Illinois courts have been actively applying
it.278 This is also the case for the Louisiana courts since the Louisiana
Supreme Court adopted the Good Samaritan Rule in Bujol.279 Both have

273.
274.

See Thompson, supra note 1, at 1059.
Id. (empirical study of the U.S.). There is new empirical evidence that this might
have been changed in both jurisdictions; Peter Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV 81, 90
(2010); Alan Dignam & Peter Oh, Disregarding the Salomon Principle: An Empirical
Analysis, 1885–2014, 39 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 16, 39 (2019). See generally Charles
Mitchell, Lifting the Corporate Veil in the English Courts: An Empirical Study, 3 CO.
FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 15 (1999) (empirical study of England).
275. See e.g., Northbound Grp. v. Norvax, 795 F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 2015)
(“[C]ourts should apply even more stringent standards to determine when to pierce the
corporate veil than they would in tort cases.”) (internal citation omitted).
276. See Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
277. See PRESSER, supra note 171, at § 2:14 (“Illinois follows the familiar two-part
test for piercing the veil, and the courts of the state appear to apply the test in a relatively
conservative manner, so that it is comparatively difficult to pierce the corporate veil.”).
278. See supra note 262.
279. See Bujol v. Entergy Servs., 922 So.2d 1113, 1128 (La. 2004) (“Louisiana courts
have declared that the strong policy of Louisiana is to favor the recognition of the
corporation’s separate existence, so that veil-piercing is an extraordinary remedy, to be
granted only rarely.”). See also James Dunne, Taking the Entergy out of Louisiana’s
Single Business Enterprise Theory, 69 LA. L. REV 691, 691 (2009) (“Traditionally, veilpiercing has been used sparingly in Louisiana and only in cases where either fraud or
misuse of the corporate form has taken place.”).
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a rather low success rate in piercing the corporate veil.280
It is evident from the discussion of the authorities in Part II that the
English courts felt obliged to tie their own hands with the separate legal
personality developed in the 1897 case Salomon v. A. Salomon.281 Limited
liability has remained the prevailing rule for 29 years since Hansmann
and Kraakman’s work. Admittedly, the English piercing rule is
unsatisfactory when assessed on the basis of equity.282 The direct liability
doctrine therefore saves the day by carving an easier path for tort victims
to receive compensation while staying in line with Hansmann and
Kraakman’s theory, even if it must be done through a different avenue.
The principle of direct liability is a more accessible solution than the
traditional piercing doctrine in the sense that the former does not require
proof of foul play.283 All it takes is excessive control by the parent
company.284 In fact, since piercing the corporate veil in England has come
to a dead end, direct liability offers the only practical route for plaintiffs
in most cases.285 This is particularly the case for transnational
corporations. Of the five cases dealing with direct liability in England,
four of them involved English parent companies and their subsidiaries in
Africa.286 They clearly present a need for a legal principle to hold
irresponsible parent companies liable with the downfall of piercing the
corporate veil. Direct liability is the solution found by the English courts.
B. CERTAINTY
The other significant aspect of the direct liability principle that needs
examination is the extent to which the application of the principle will
reach consistent and predictable results. This Section will start with the
assessment on English law, followed by the same on U.S. law.
280. See King Fung Tsang, The Interdependence of Conflict of Laws and Piercing the
Corporate Veil, 53-55, 89 (2016) (S.J.D. thesis, Georgetown University Law Center) (on
file with the author) (comparing with the general piercing rate of 35.25 percent, Illinois
and Louisiana have a piercing rate of 27.45 percent and 31.82 percent).
281. In England, Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 2 is the leading case
that establishes the concept of separate legal personality.
282. The English perception of the role of justice in corporate veil cases reflects a
more formalistic approach to judicial decision-making. See Cheng, supra note 29, at 354.
283. See Petrin, supra note 8, at 612.
284. Id.
285. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
286. See Lubbe v. Cape Industry PLC [2000] 1 WLR 1545 (HL) (appeal taken from
Eng.), AAA v. Unilever PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 1532, Vedanta Resources plc v.
Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell plc [2021] UKSC 3.
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In comparison with the existing rule of piercing the corporate veil,
under English law, the result of the direct liability doctrine’s application
is less-than-certain. After Lord Sumption’s attempt to render the doctrine
toothless in Prest, English courts have consistently refused to pierce the
corporate veil.287 In contrast, the English Supreme Court has kept the door
open for expansion of direct liability.288 To achieve its purpose, the Court
has repeatedly refused to develop limiting principles that would confine
the general application of the control prong.289 There has not been any
articulation of a bright line test concerning precise degree of control that
would suffice for finding the assumption of responsibility.290 The four
indicia laid out in Chandler291 are perhaps the most elaborated elements
of the discussion. Still, the Supreme Court in Vedanta expressly held that
these indicia are no more than examples.292
Thus, when assessing certainty through the lens of predictability of
results, on the surface, the piercing doctrine takes the prize.293 However,
it could be argued that the proper comparison would be considering how
piercing the corporate veil is applied in similarly situated tort cases. In
that scenario, the court would have to delve deeply into the intention of
the parent company in setting up the subsidiary,294 since there must exist
287. The most recent rejection is Hurstwood Properties v. Rossendale Borough
Council [2021] UKSC 16 (Eng.).
288. See supra Section II.B.3-4
289. See supra Sections II.B.3-4.a.
290. Id.
291. Chandler v. Cape plc [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [80].
292. Vedanta [2019] UKSC at [56].
293. See Pey Woan Lee, The Enigma of Veil-Piercing, 26 INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV.
28 (2015) (“In Prest, Lord Sumption sought to resolve this tension [between certainty
and equity] by first acknowledging, at a general level, the importance of both ends, but
ultimately he ascribes far greater weight to certainty through a highly restrictive
definition of ‘abuse.’”). See also Daisuke Ikuta, The Legal Measures against the Abuse
of Separate Corporate Personality and Limited Liability by Corporate Groups: The
Scope of Chandler v. Cape Plc and Thompson v. Renwick Group Plc, 6 UCL J.L. & JURIS.
60, 82 (mentioning arbitrariness and legal uncertainty as the most frequent criticism
against direct liability).
294. Watkins and Nsubuga state the following:

However, the difficulty in considering whether the company is indeed,
a ‘mere façade’ would seem to be dependant on particular facts of the
case. It does seem clear that the motivation of the individual director
is important when considering any misconduct with regard to the
company. Misconduct may or may not be contemporaneous with the
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an element of impropriety.295 Typically, there will be evidence that cuts
both ways. Some facts might point towards the subsidiary being a mere
façade, while others might suggest the contrary, requiring the court to
make a thorough inquiry. Theoretically, assessment of evidence as to
control exercised is arguably more objective than that of intention. Even
the distinction that Lord Sumption himself drew, between veil-piercing
on the ground of evasion and the concealment principle, has been
described as “difficult to appreciate, if not conceptually flawed.”296 In
addition, as reflected in the reasoning of subsequent piercing the corporate
veil cases, it seems that the courts still feel uncertain as to the status of the
evasion principle. For instance, in Hurstwood,297 discussed above, the
court applied the evasion principle against the facts even though the
Supreme Court still questioned its continued existence.298 In truth, the
precise test has not been ironed out and there is still puzzlement among
the courts.299 Therefore, while it could be said that a piercing the corporate
veil submission before an English court is likely to fail, the certainty of
such a result is not based on a settled test or reasoning.
In its defense, the looseness of the principles of control for direct
liability is for a good cause. As analyzed in the previous Section, direct
liability arose to bring justice on behalf of claimants who suffered from
incorporation, but relevant to the instant case, and the misconduct and
use of the company must have some correlation or link in legal terms.
See Watkins and Nsubuga, supra note 28, at 552.
295. Watkins and Nsubuga continue to state the following:
Misconduct or impropriety can range quite widely. For instance, it
may be an unusual case, such as that of public policy as in the case of
Daimler Co. Ltd. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co. Ltd., where the
veil was required to be lifted in order to discover the identity and
possible involvement of enemy Germans in the company during the
First World War. It may be fraud, where the incorporation has been
used to conceal criminal activities.
See id.
296. CHRISTIAN A. WITTING, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE GROUPS AND NETWORKS 317
(2018). See also Ariel Mucha, Piercing the Corporate Veil Doctrine Under English
Company Law After Prest v. Petrodel Decision 14-15 (Allerhand Inst., Working Paper
No. 19/2017) (criticising the dubious nature of the decision).
297. Hurstwood Properties v. Rossendale Borough Council [2021] UKSC 16, [71][72].
298. Id. at [71].
299. Id.
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abuse of the Salomon principle, which the piercing doctrine fails to
entertain.300 The doctrine’s purpose of combating corporate abuse makes
flexibility its inevitable companion . Despite being two entirely different
rules, an analogy can be drawn from the flexibility of the United States
piercing doctrine. Most courts in the United States subscribe to the
contract-tort dichotomy when it comes to piercing the corporate veil,
implicating a more flexible application of the doctrine for tort creditors,
with reference to the totality of the circumstances test.301 The justification
for this leeway is that “its equitable nature demands that it be flexible.” 302
Along the same line, as it is an equitable principle at heart, it is quite right
for the English courts to maintain the flexibility in direct liability as much
as possible. As this area of law continues to develop, there will be more
helpful guidance and examples from courts and scholars alike. Again, it
is suggested that the English court could consider the laundry lists of
factors developed by U.S. courts in certain states, which are helpful for
the courts as they make their determinations.303
Moreover, under the current principle, determination of direct
liability cases is highly fact-sensitive,304 which is also a reason there
should not be standardized criteria, as it would straight-jacket the courts.
As Arden LJ observed, it is simply not possible to say in all cases what is
or is not a normal incident of that relationship.305 Consequently, the Court
refused to employ a threshold test for assumption of responsibility that
would restrict the principle to abnormal incidents of the relationship
between a parent and subsidiary.
300.
301.
302.

See supra Section V.A.
See Peterson, supra note 172, at 73.
See Peterson, supra note 172, at 83. See also Jane C. Schlict, Comment, Piercing
the Nonprofit Corporate Veil, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 134, 141 (1982) (explaining the
justification).
303. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. M.C.K. Inc., 736 N.E.2d 373, 381 n.19 (Mass. 2000)
(setting out a laundry list of 12 factors to consider for the purpose of piercing the
corporate veil).
304. Thompson v. Renwick Group plc has demonstrated how fact-sensitive the
determination of direct liability is. Even though there was appointment by the parent of
a director to the subsidiary in charge of health and safety at the subsidiary; links between
the parent and subsidiary, including, common paperwork used within the group,
provision of taxi by the parent to transport the plaintiff; use of lorry that was in parent’s
livery; and co-operation amongst different subsidiaries of the parent. See Thompson v.
Renwick Group plc [2014] EWCA (Civ) 635, [19]. The Court still held that these facts
were far removed from that of Chandler. Id. at 29.
305. See Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [67].

2022]

WHEN ONE DOOR CLOSES, ANOTHER OPENS

187

Being too rigid in formulating the principles also draws the risk that
corporations will design tactics in order to circumvent liability.306 For
instance, if the court established a criterion that “employment of group
medical officer will be regarded as assumption of responsibility,” it is
likely that the very next advice the group attorney would give would be
to lay off such officer.307 Since many of these group-wide policies are
there to protect the well-being of employees, tactics that try to get away
with responsibility may harm the benefits potentially available to
claimants.
Another confusion is the relevance of the Caparo threefold test in
analyzing direct liability. On the one hand, the Court of Appeal in
Chandler grounded the development of direct liability on the Caparo test,
with the detailed application outlined above.308 On the other hand, in more
recent cases the U.K. Supreme Court frowned on the lower court’s
approach in analyzing the case with the Caparo test.309 In the Supreme
Court’s opinion, the liability of parent companies in relation to their
subsidiaries is not, in itself, a distinct category of liability in common law
negligence, and that the general principles on which this liability is found
are not novel at all.310 Instead, it was thought that the principles could be
traced back as far as the decision of the House of Lords in Dorset Yacht.311
Taking a step back to revisit Caparo, the biggest message conveyed
by the House of Lords was that future developments of the duty of care
should be made in an incremental and cautious way. During an evaluation
of the duty of care, a case should be compared with factually analogous
precedents where a duty of care was established. If the case before the
court appears to be novel, amounting to an expansion of existing duty of
care, the court should apply the threefold test.312 Therefore, it could be
said that the Dorset Yacht Supreme Court simply found the element of
control akin to that exerted by parent companies on subsidiaries and, in
doing so, recognized the assumption of responsibility as an existing
category of duty of care by comparing it with a precedent. The distinction
in views between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal perhaps lies
306. See Andrew Sanger, Case and Comment, Parent Company Duty of Care to Third
Parties Harmed by Overseas Subsidiaries, 78 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 486, (2019).
307. See Petrin, supra note 8, at 619.
308. See Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) at [62]-[63].
309. See Vedanta Res. PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 [56]; Okpabi v. Royal
Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3 [151].
310. See supra note 127.
311. See Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20 at [54].
312. Caparo Indus. v. Dickman [1990] HL 1 at 5 (Engl.).
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in the reason that Arden LJ did not find this line of cases analogous with
Dorset Yacht. Nevertheless, their approaches are not contradictory in
principle, and subsequent cases now have the endorsement by the highest
court in England that this is an established duty of care.
Much of the same problem on uncertainty discussed above applies
to the direct liability rule in the United States. Like its English
counterpart, the doctrine was criticized for its unpredictability. In Golbert,
the court commented that the application of direct liability is “tricky,”
since it requires the court to distinguish between eccentric control and
normal control exercised by investors.313 Similarly, the Good Samaritan
Rule was said to be “so complicated and fact-specific as to make it
virtually impossible for anyone to predict in advance whether their
volunteer activities will or will not be protected from liability.”314 In
addition, while direct liability and the Good Samaritan Rule are both
principles derived from tort, no court seems to have been able to clearly
discern the difference between them.315 On principle, direct liability
focuses on control, while the Good Samaritan Rule does not formally
require such a focus.316 However, in the context of the parent-subsidiary
relationship, commentators have argued that control is implicitly the gist
of the Good Samaritan Rule.317 This emphasis on control in direct liability
and the Good Samaritan Rule may sometimes overlap with the control
313. See Golbert v. Aurora Chi. Lakeshore Hosp., No. 19-CV-08257, 2021 WL
952528, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2021).
314. See Paul Taylor, We’re All in This Together: Extending Sovereign Immunity to
Encourage Private Parties to Reduce Public Risk, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1595, 1644 (2007).
315. One Massachusetts state court clearly looks at them as separate rules. Born v.
Simonds Intern., 26 Mass.L.Rptr. 416, at *5 (Supp. Ct. 2009).

Before turning to [direct liability], it is useful to point out certain
theories of parent corporation liability that [the plaintiff] has expressly
stated he is not relying upon . . . . [He] does not contend that [the
parent company] assumed a duty to protect him from unsafe condition
‘by affirmatively undertaking to provide a safe working environment
at the subsidiary.’
Id.

316.
317.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A(b) (AM. L. INST. 1965).
See Bujol v. Entergy Servs., 922 So.2d 1113, 1131 (La. 2004) (highlighting that
courts have considered “the scope of the parent’s involvement, the extent of the parent’s
authority” in determining whether there is an undertaking by the parent to assume
subsidiary’s duty).
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prong of the piercing doctrine, even though both direct liability and the
Good Samaritan Rule are transaction-specific, whereas the piercing
doctrine looks at the corporate relationship as a whole.318 For example,
My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms319 was cited by Forsythe as
one of the authorities on direct liability.320 However, the case has long
been regarded in Massachusetts as authoritative on piercing the corporate
veil, not direct liability.321 This is because the court did not refer to either
principle by name and merely analyzed the control exercised by the parent
over the subsidiary in its assessment of parent’s liability. On application,
it seems that direct liability may have an easier chance to succeed given
the strictness of the Good Samaritan Rule. Finally, as highlighted above,
some courts have reservations about the direct liability doctrine.322 This
gives rise to forum shopping opportunity and could lead to uncertain
results. Thus, the uneven practices on direct liability and the Good
Samaritan Rule among the states makes improving the level of certainty
of these principles in the United States much more difficult when
compared with the English courts, which can follow the lead of the U.K.
Supreme Court that have clearly shown a strong interest in further
developing the direct liability doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper compares the developments of the direct liability
principle across the Atlantic. It starts with an examination of the
simultaneous curtailing of the piercing the corporate veil doctrine and
expansion of the direct liability principle in England, exclusively in the
context of tort cases. Both principles evolved for the same purpose–to
curb the abuse of separate legal entities and restore fairness for the
claimants who are adversely affected as a result. This Article reviewed
landmark cases that exemplified the basis upon which the English courts
grounded themselves in establishing this non-novel liability. In
conclusion, direct liability has evolved as an alternative and even better

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See supra Part IV.
353 Mass. 614 (1968).
Forsythe v. Clark USA, 864 N.E.2d 227, 238 (Ill. 2007).
See, e.g., Born v. Simonds Int’l Corp., 26 MASS. L. RPTR. 416, at 5.
See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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solution to the earlier piercing doctrine due to its satisfaction of two
criteria, equity and certainty.
First, direct liability carries an element of equity that has been
overlooked by the current piercing doctrine under English law. This
equity element of direct liability was evinced by the provision of a more
accessible and practical solution to tort victims who were left out in the
cold by the narrow doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Moving on to
certainty, we detailed that there have been doubts and challenges in this
respect. Yet, since a determination of direct liability eases the court from
consideration of intention and impropriety, it was concluded that this
evolving principle still improves this aspect of the law.
On the United States side, direct liability can be seen as a supplement
to the piercing doctrine, which is much broader and more alive than its
English counterpart. On equity, despite the U.S. piercing doctrine’s
incorporation of the injustice prong, direct liability still offers a
potentially easier alternative to tort creditors without having to prove the
injustice that is required in the piercing doctrine.323 There is no need to
prove total domination of the subsidiary by the parent, all it takes is
eccentric control in the activities leading to injury. On certainty, direct
liability suffers from the same problem as the English principle, given its
fact-specific nature. However, such fact-intensive inquiry is
commonplace in corporate law disputes, and courts in the United States
have extensive experience dealing with them. Balancing between its
advantage in equity and limited shortcoming in certainty, it is suggested
that direct liability is a good supplement to the piercing doctrine in U.S.
jurisdictions that use a traditional, rather than a strict, piercing rule. The
same can be said about the Good Samaritan Rule, which is also based in
tort and involves much of the same inquiry on transaction-specific control
by the parent. On the other hand, if a state already has a broad piercing
rule, then the direct liability doctrine will be less necessary. Therefore, it
is unlikely that direct liability will have vast development in the United
States the way it has had in England over the last few years.
All in all, the law shall always find a way to tackle abuse of the
corporate form. Direct liability and piercing the corporate veil can both
achieve that end to various extents, and the United States status quo shows
that one may not necessarily be better than the other. They can, in fact,
323. Esmark v. N.L.R.B., 887 F.2d 739, 754-755 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding direct
liability on the facts which would not have supported an argument of piercing the
corporate veil).
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complement each other. However, given that the English courts have
practically given up on the piercing doctrine, it is the authors’ conviction
that there has been a significant improvement of the English company law
since creation of direct liability.

